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THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE:
THE OCCIDENT AND THE ORIENT IN CHILD CUSTODY

Susan S. M. Edwards​[1]​


English Law: Patriarchal and Heteronormative
Custody Claims Through Time

This article considers the application and interpretation of the principle of the “welfare of the child” as it is imagined and mediated by competing claims of culture, parentage, and international human rights law in the context of child custody disputes arising from relocation and asylum applications, especially across the frontiers of West to East. Since the meaning of “welfare of the child” is indeterminate, it has been construed differently in time and place when considering claims within a jurisdiction and when considering inter-jurisdictional claims, leaving outcomes fluid and the future of children born to parents originating from different jurisdictions uncertain. 
	The welfare of the child is construed via several “rights” claims, including “the child” and “family life”. Both carry different meanings in negotiations between West and East and, given the focus of this article, especially countries in the Middle East. The dissimilarity is construed by some as the impact of a rigid interpretation of Islam in Sharia law, whereas others argue that the difference is nothing more or less than the enduring problem of an unyielding patriarchal hegemony. Both understandings are reflected in legal judgments. This article concludes with a plea for the recognition that the right to “gender equality” in Western rights, because it is a peremptory norm, must be accorded a central place in judicial reasoning in custody disputes because a child’s enjoyment of a mother’s care and custodianship is conjoined both with the mother’s well-being and her right to equality as a carer.
	The legitimacy of custody claims, both of claimants’ rights to custody and children’s rights to custodianship, has evolved as the status of claims, claimants, and beneficiaries has changed with the social, demographic, cultural, and legal landscape and the formulation and cognition of the custody rights jurisprudence, which has moved its epicentre from “rights of parents” to “responsibilities of parents”. Moreover, the emerging social and legal recognition of the wishes of the child has considerable weight in these matters. A judge must take into account all these factors when deciding matters concerning child custody. In addition, in arriving at a decision, a judge must also be conscious of his or her own subjective position and his or her own potential prejudice about what kind of family life is best and with which parent, and indeed, when the matter extends across jurisdictions, which jurisdiction might be better able to deliver the welfare of the child. One dimension of this changing landscape is captured by Baroness Hale:

Once upon a time it was assumed that all very young children should be cared for by their mothers, but that older boys might well be better off with their fathers. Nowadays we know that some fathers are very well able to provide everyday care for even their very young children and are quite prepared to prioritise their children’s needs over the demands of their own careers. Once upon a time it was assumed that mothers who had committed the matrimonial offence of adultery were only fit to care for their children if the father agreed to this. Nowadays we recognise that a mother’s misconduct is no more relevant than a father’s: the question is always the impact it will have on the child’s upbringing and well-being. Once upon a time it may have been assumed that there was only one way of bringing up children. Nowadays we know that there are many routes to a healthy and well-adjusted adulthood. We are not so arrogant as to think that we know best.​[2]​

	In considering the legitimacy of claimants and claims and their impact on the construction and shaping of the welfare principle, three distinct phases can be identified in the historical development of United Kingdom law. The first phase can be observed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and is characterized by the claim of the father to the absolute custody and body of his offspring, a position that relied on a presumption of the claims of natural law governing parenthood in family matters (today in parts of the Middle East, for example, the father’s claim as hegemonic remains relatively intact, a matter to which this article returns later).​[3]​ The second phase was ushered in at the beginning of the twentieth century,​[4]​ when fathers and mothers each had a claim to the custody of their children (provided of course that the mother conformed to the stereotype of appropriate womanhood, propriety, and conduct); by the mid-twentieth century, under the Guardianship Act of 1973, mothers were for the first time recognized as having the same rights as fathers and their conduct as a ground for denial of custody fell away.​[5]​ The third phase emerged with the introduction of the Children Act (1989), where the father’s absolute right to custody is extinguished in s.2(4): “The rule of law that a father is the natural guardian of his legitimate child is abolished”; and, where married, the mother and father have equal claims to custody provided that they can demonstrate that they can care adequately for the child. However, where the parties are not married, a mother’s custody claim supersedes any claim of the father: s.2(2): “Where a child’s father and mother were not married to each other at the time of his birth—(a)the mother shall have parental responsibility for the child ...”. And, since the introduction of the Human Rights Act (1998), the overarching obligations of the European Convention on Human Rights are ever present. 
	The more equal position of mothers and fathers is reflected in the recent development of “shared custody” orders. In Re L (A Child) (Internal Relocation: Shared Residence Order) (2009)​[6]​ the judge, in recognizing the disharmony that ensues resulting from separation, said:  

L must therefore be able to appreciate that even though her parents are separated, they have respect for each other. Most disputes about children following parental separation have nothing to do with the children concerned: they are about the parents fighting all over again the battles of the past, and seeking retribution for the supposed ills and injustices inflicted on them during the relationship.​[7]​

	Wilson J in Re F (Shared Residence Order) (2003)​[8]​ summed up the aspiration of joint or shared residence and the importance of labels and of the “performative”​[9]​ purpose and impact of language in achieving a specific goal: “Speaking for myself, I make no bones about it: to make a shared residence order to reflect the arrangements here chosen by the judge is to choose one label rather than another ... But labels can be very important ... Indeed, where there is proximity of homes and arrangements between the two parents can be easily facilitated such cases are better suited to joint residency”.​[10]​

Natural Law - the English Omnipotent Father

	The omnipotent father of family law was indeed the very same father Frederick Engels had observed in The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State​[11]​ when he critiqued capitalism, patriarchy, and the division of labor by sex arrangements, all of which subjugated the wife and mother. Family law of the nineteenth century, as indeed in earlier times, was created by the bourgeois/aristocratic family where the common law developed largely around the rights of the upper classes, they being the only parties who could afford to bring disputes before the Chancery courts. The common law preserved the arbitrary power of the authority of the father over his wife and his children. The leading case of Agar Ellis​[12]​ reaffirmed the bedrock of patriarchal hegemony in determining the rights of the Honorable Leopold Agar –Ellis (son of Lord and Lady Dover, and brother of Viscount Clifden) and his wife, the Honorable Harriet Stoner (daughter of Lord and Lady Camoys). 
	This was not an action involving parents from the working classes, industrial poor or rural peasantry, but the wealthy landed gentry. He was of the Protestant religion and she, a Roman Catholic, and it was described at the time as a “mixed marriage”. When the oldest of the father’s children, at nine years of age, refused to accompany him to church, he instated action to ward his children and took out a summons to direct their education.​[13]​ Their mother responded and took out a summons challenging the decision of the court which had prevented her from taking the children to Roman Catholic services. The father then removed the children, placing them with clergymen, and allowed the mother to visit once a month, requiring all correspondence between the mother and the children to go through him. In 1883, when the daughter Harriet was 16 years of age, she begged to attend Catholic services and live with her mother. It was agreed that she could attend services. Harriet sent a letter to her solicitors: “I am always amongst strangers. I am longing to see some of my relations.”. I am always amongst strangers” .​[14]​ The father opposed the petition, which requested that she spend two months of each year with her mother because he said it “would tend to create a great prejudice in the child’s mind ... and might result in entirely alienating her affection from him”.​[15]​ Brett MR concluded that the court will interfere with the rights of the father only where there is moral turpitude of “great immorality or excessive cruelty”,​[16]​ or where the father abdicated parental authority. The progressive judges, Cotton LJ and Bowen LJ, disagreed with the fathers’ objection. Bowen LJ famously and boldly said: “if we were not in a Court of Law, but in a court of critics... “we might be tempted to comment” ... but it is a court of law”,​[17]​ and in applying the law as they conceded they must, asserted that the father’s authority “never ought to be slighted”.​[18]​ The father’s family rights were aligned as if natural law rights. Brett MR concluded: “I adopt myself the expression of the rule of the conduct of the Court as between father and child as laid down by Vice-Chancellor Bacon in the case of Re Plomley ... I cannot see that it is possible to lay down the rule more clearly. He says: ‘“Appeals have been made to the principles of the law which have been settled for centuries. Those principles have never been called into question. One of those principles (and it is the prominent one) is that this Court, whatever be its authority or jurisdiction, has no right to interfere with the sacred right of a father over his own children’. It seems to me that in that word ‘sacred’ the Vice-Chancellor has summed-up all that I have endeavoured to express. The rights of a testamentary guardian, or any other legal guardian, are legal rights. The rights of a father are sacred rights because his duties are sacred duties”.​[19]​
Malins VC had similarly declared in Agar Ellis (No 1),​[20]​ citing Lord O’Hagan: “the authority of the father ... is a very sacred thing ... bestowed by the Almighty”,​[21]​ and was echoed by James LJ who asserted that the right of the father to the custody and control of his children is one of the most sacred of rights.​[22]​ Malins VC also claimed that this was after all “common sense”:​[23]​ “The principles of this Court are the principles of common sense and the principles of propriety that the children must be brought up in the religion of the father”.​[24]​ And so, brutal patriarchy within nineteenth century common law was masked behind a veneer of ‘the sacred” and, if that was not enough to persuade, then “common sense”.​[25]​ 
Certainly this case demonstrated what Rorty has critiqued: “But the standard philosophical strategy of most naturalisms is to find some way of showing that our own culture has indeed got hold of the essence of man”.​[26]​ In effect, the discourse of patriarchy claimed indeed to be the very essence of civilization. Habermasian reflections on the way in which knowledge is monopolized by constantive speech, theoretical reason, and propositional truth are particularly instructive: “The claim that our norms can be grounded is redeemed through legitimizing world-views. The validity of these world-views is in turn secured in a communication structure that excludes discursive will-formation … the barriers to communication which make a fiction precisely of the reciprocal imputation of accountability, support at the same time the belief in legitimacy that sustains the fiction and prevents its being found out”.​[27]​ Contemporary Eastern arguments around modern custody battles are similarly couched  in the language of natural law, Sharia law assuming  the same “sacredness,”​[28]​ the same “common sense”, whereby the Sharia is divinely ordained and patriarchal power chosen, favoring one privileged relation to the objective world. During the twentieth century, the rule in Agar Ellis was repeatedly challenged as sacredness gave way to modernity and secularism. Lord Denning in Hewar v Bryant (1970) said: “I would get rid of the rule in re Agar Ellis 24 Ch D 317 and of the suggested exceptions to it”.​[29]​ Lord Scarman in Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority (1986) ​[30]​ agreed, sayingasserting, “There is much in the earlier case law which this house must discard—almost everything I would say but its principle. For example, the horrendous Agar-Ellis decisions, 10 Ch.D. 49; 24 Ch.D. 317 of the late 19th century asserting the power of the father over his child were rightly remaindered to the history books by the Court of Appeal in Hewer v Bryant.”​[31]​ Remaindered they were!

Towards Shared Parenting 

	If the law has yielded to accommodate the demands for equality in heteronormative expectations and models of parenthood, further challenges were made to this template by same-sex couples who demonstrated that the reality of family life in real time was also made up of same-sex​[32]​ and transsexual ​[33]​partners and their families. In R v E&F (2010)​[34]​ the child lived with her mother and her mother’s civil partner,​[35]​ who had acquired parental responsibility. The father was also in a same-sex relationship and had not acquired parental responsibility for the child, although he visited the child regularly. After a dispute and dissatisfaction with contact, the father issued an application for staying contact and parental responsibility. The mother responded and issued an application for a joint residence order with her civil partner. At the child’s request, overnight contact was agreed with the father. The court made a joint residence order in favor of the mother and her civil partner, approved contact of 50 days per year with the father, and dismissed the father’s application for parental responsibility and shared residence. However, shared residence, even when intended to treat parents equally whatever the factual matrix, cannot always overcome existing acrimony. In T v T (2010),​[36]​ in a case involving two female same sex partners and a gay man, Lady Justice Black said: “What is profoundly disappointing is to see how, in practice, instead of bringing greater benefits for children, shared joint residence can simply serve as a battlefield for the adults in the children's lives, so that even when the practicalities of how a child’s time should be split are agreed or determined by the court they continue to fight over what label is to be put on the arrangement”. 

Child Centeredness

	If Harriet Stoner’s daughter (also named Harriet) was denied the right to her mother’s visitation and custody of her, today the “wishes and feelings of the child” are now firmly embedded in the law at the international and domestic levels. At the domestic level, the wishes and feelings of the child are enshrined in three sources of law. First, the Family Law Reform Act 1969 (FLRA 1969), s.8 grants 16 to 17-year-olds the right to consent to their own medical treatment: “The consent of a minor who has attained the age of sixteen years to any surgical, medical or dental treatment which, in the absence of consent, would constitute a trespass to his person, shall be as effective as it would be if he were of full age; and where a minor has by virtue of this section given an effective consent to any treatment it shall not be necessary to obtain any consent for it from his parent or guardian”. Second, the House of Lords in the momentous decision in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Health Authority (1986)​[37]​ held that adolescents who have sufficient understanding and maturity to make their own decisions in certain matters should be allowed to do so. Third, the Children Act 1989 (CA 1989), s.1(3)(a) places a duty upon the court and upon the local authority to consider the child’s wishes and feelings as part of the consideration of the child’s welfare. 
	International human rights law elevates and enshrines the rights of the child. First, the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) defines children’s rights to include participation and imposes obligations on Member States to implement national laws to enforce those rights (as of 30 June 2014, 194 countries were parties to the UNCRC). Article 12(1) provides:

States parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. (2) For this purpose the child in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.

	Second, the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention​[38]​ recognizes the wishes of the child and provides that the court or administrative authority of the requested State “is not bound to order the return of the child if … the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody right at the time of the removal or retention, or had consented or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention, or the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views” (Article 13). 
	However the realization of children’s rights does not take place in a hermetically sealed vacuum. Children’s rights are mediated and realized in conjunction with the status of women as mothers and as putative carers for children (including grandmothers and other female family members). The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is of enormous significance:

1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: ... (d). the same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount ...” (Article 16).

	Additionally, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) protects the rights of all individuals, including children; family law, just as all other areas of United Kingdom law, must be compatible with Convention rights (Human Rights Act 1998 s.3). This means that public authorities, including the courts and tribunals, must be compliant (s.6(1), 6(3)(a), with the ECHR (including Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention; Articles 1 to 3, First Protocol; and Article 1, Thirteenth Protocol, as read with Articles 16 to 18 of the Convention). The following Articles are of special importance: Article 8, ECHR, concerns – the right to respect for private and family life: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. Article 14, ECHR, concerns: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this European Convention on Human Rights shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”.
	These domestic and international obligations, regarded as emancipatory scripts, are engaged when matters of child custody between East and West arise.

Enter “Claims of Culture”

	Whilst the development of the law (outlined above) has recognized and addressed the problem of patriarchy and the voicelessness of the child in the United Kingdom, more recently considerations of “culture” and the multiple meanings this term bears, where parents are from different ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds, are matters which have been considered in judicial reasoning and decision making where the welfare of the child is to be determined. “Culture” is a term loosely used to imply, among other dimensions and characteristics, race, ethnicity, and religion. When these “cultural”  differences arise, judicial decision making with regard to child custody and specific issues relating to the upbringing of the child has resulted in judges being criticized  for construing what is “in the best interests of the child” or otherwise the “welfare of the child as paramount” principle, through their own subjective and Eurocentric/Ethnocentric and heteronormative lens. ​[39]​ The welfare of the child has no fixed or unitary meaning; its secret will not be revealed by merely incantating it. In a similarly veined critique of human rights, Sardar writes: “There is … nothing ‘natural’ about human rights … just as democracy is a cynical ploy for post modernising the non-west, human rights too have become an instrument for promoting the western agenda”.​[40]​ The question is whether any judge can ever make a judgement about an issue involving competing and diverse legal and cultural traditions without being ethnocentric. Simply is this an ontological or cognitive possibility? Judicial opinion is so often presumed to be over-deterministically Eurocentric, as is the belief that principles which derive from outside the culture under judgment are without validity. In this debate Professor Michael Freeman quotes Philip Alston, who says culture “must not be accorded the status of a metanorm which trumps rights”. We I concur with Freeman that whilst there are cultural practices which it is possible to reconcile with the best interests standard, and there are others which fall outside any “margin of appreciation”. Custom and culture must, of course, be considered, but we one must also be wary, as Mill wrote, of the “despotism of custom”​[41]​ echoed by Poulter, who warned of the “bane of custom”.​[42]​ Custom or culture must not be elevated to the level of the “divine” or “natural”, nor must it be a cloak to veil patriarchy which lurks beneath. Freeman also argues that “subjectivity need not collapse into arbitrariness”​[43]​ and draws upon a concept developed by Arendt​[44]​ of the “enlarged mentality” as an important framework for understanding. Freeman proposes a path which avoids cultural relativism and eschews Orientalism. Orientalism for these purposes is that ideology identified by Edward Said,​[45]​ whereby the West perceives the East as inferior: “We need, I stress, to find ways to engage in debate to enable distinct communities of judgment to hear each other sufficiently to include each other in their exercise of enlarged mentality”.​[46]​ 

Legal Cultural Relativism in the Welfare Principle

	An early case which considered “cultural” issues and their relevance to a child’s upbringing and identity was Re M (Child’s Upbringing) (1996).​[47]​ This case involved a male child (P) of Zulu background. He and his mother were living with a white family in Transvaal, South Africa. The boy’s biological parents were Zulus, both coming from an area of the Transvaal known as Leboa. The appellant was a white South African of Afrikaner descent who came to England in 1969, later married an Englishman, and acquired British nationality. The husband subsequently died; the wife returned to England on 16 March 1992 with her daughters and P, with the consent of his biological parents, who had worked as housekeeper and nanny to her children. The appellant had become attached to P, and because of the increasing instability in South Africa, she offered to take responsibility for him in a way that would enable him to remain a member of her family. The appellant told the United Kingdom immigration authorities that she wished to adopt P (who was then 9 years of age). He was given leave to remain for three months, and the appellant issued an application for an adoption and a residence order on 28 July 1994. On 29 September 1994, P was made a ward of court. P’s biological parents objected to the application(s) and wanted him returned to them; there are letters which included pleadings by the biological mother for the child to return to her. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court and held that P should be returned to his biological parents even though he had expressed the wish to remain with the appellant, with whom a strong attachment had been formed. The boy’s wishes and feelings were ignored almost completely. Some implied reference was made to the by then well-established principle of “Gillick competence”, where Thorpe J accepted that if, in two years’ time, the boy, who was ten years of age at the hearing, still wished to remain with the foster parents, his wishes would “have” to be taken into account.​[48]​ What exactly did that statement mean? Presumably the wishes of a 12-year-old boy simply could no longer be ignored.​[49]​ 
	Legal cultural relativism informed the conclusions of the court, no doubt set against the United Kingdom political backdrop of raging debates, especially within social work practice, where the Black Association of Social Workers expressed outrage at inter-racial adoptions, especially ones that had failed. Into this moral and political soup came the Ghanian (black) Paul Boeteng, who took a different view, arguing that the anti-inter-racial placement lobby was in fact (in denying black children the right to be raised in a family, albeit a white family) consigning the black child to institutional care. Thorpe J, in the court of first instance, on 19 June 1995 claimed to have based his decision to return the child to his biological parents in South Africa on Lord Templeman’s reasoning in Re KD (1988),​[50]​ when he said: “The best person to bring up a child is the natural parent. It matters not whether the parent is wise or foolish, rich or poor, educated or illiterate, provided the child’s moral and physical health are not in danger. Public authorities cannot improve on nature”. Thorpe J said: “The starting-point for a court in wardship was the strong supposition, other things being equal, that it was in the interests of a child that he should be brought up by his natural parents ... and not, as the judge had suggested, either the biological or the psychological parents according to the circumstances. The judge had concluded that the child’s development must be Zulu development and not Afrikaans or English development; in order to expedite this, the proper course was to order the boy’s return to South Africa”.​[51]​ 
	Neill and Ward LJJ, in the Court of Appeal, insisted that the boy be returned to his biological parents (against the express wishes of the child). Neill LJ cites the following extracts from Dr Cameron’s potentially conflicting evidence. On the one hand, he said:

If you take him away now from the [appellant’s] family against his will, then the risk is that he will go downhill emotionally, he will go downhill psychologically, he will pine for [the appellant] and [her girls], he will get grumpy and disagreeable, he will not quickly grasp Ndelele and Afrikaans, he will be a bit of an outsider with the group when he gets there and everything may go horribly wrong...​[52]​

	On the other, he said:

For [P] to have the gain of education in England carries with it the weakening of his Zulu identity, his knowledge of the Zulu language and culture and so on and there are gains and losses. If he is brought up in the Zulu culture, he has the gain of identity with his family of origin and the loss of being a citizen of the larger world.​[53]​

	And so in this case, despite the wishes and feelings of the child (it has been said that he was dragged to the airport and put on to a plane, only to return some months later to England by consent). In reality, it was culture and Zulu development which exerted the strongest claims rather than any rights of the biological parents over non-biological parents. 
	Re B (1995)​[54]​ involved a couple who made an application in adoption proceedings to adopt a 4-year-old child from Gambia. The facts were that the prospective adopters, Mr. and Mrs. W, were on holiday in Gambia in a local market when they saw the child of two years strapped to her mother's back. Mrs. W was enchanted by her, and soon Mr. and Mrs. W were introduced to the father and to members of the extended family.​[55]​ The court queried:

	Does the harm that will be caused outweigh the benefits ..? In my view a child has in principle a right to be brought up by his or her parents in the way of life and in the religion practised by the parents. That principle, however, is not absolute. It is an expression of what would ordinarily be in the child's interests and falls to be displaced where the welfare of the child requires it to be displaced. The test accordingly is welfare. It follows that the weight which has to be given to what generically I may term ‘heritage' or ‘birthright' will vary from case to case. In some cases it will be of minimal importance. In others it will be of great weight if not decisive benefit which B will otherwise derive from being brought up by her parents in the cultural heritage and traditions into which she was born.”​[56]​ 

	Wall J decided to return the child to Gambia for her to grow up with her birth family in the culture and traditions “into which she was born”. The court also noted that judged by Ganbian standards the parents were highly advantaged. The court also noted that in Gambian terms the parents were highly advantaged. In this case the judge said:

In my judgment, therefore, I am entitled to consider matters other than welfare, including at one end of the spectrum the status of adoption in the Gambia, questions of immigration status and public policy, and at the other the social consequences of an adoption for the child in terms, for example of her siblings and family life in the Gambia generally.

	Perhaps in this case, where a child even though lovingly and albeit through an informal arrangement was plucked from Gambia with no ties to the United Kingdom, cultural arguments in favor of return are more than justified. 
	Many cases where specific issues in relation to a child’s upbringing have arisen shed light on differences between parents’ approach to upbringing determined by culture, religion and custom. It has been for the courts to decide in a multi-cultural context exactly where the interests of the child lie. In Re S (Change of Names: Cultural Factors) (2001)​[57]​ following divorce from a Sikh, the Muslim mother wanted to change the child’s Sikh name and also have the boy (of five years) circumcised. The judge, Wilson J, ordering a change of name and circumcision, said:

I have found this to be a difficult case and, less relevantly, a very interesting case. It arouses deep and, in my experience, unusual problems. They arise from the fact that in 1996, when she was aged 17, the mother, a Bangladeshi Moslem girl, ran away from home with the father, a Sikh man then aged 22, started a sexual relationship with him and married him in Gretna Green. She had had an extremely sheltered and, from the perspective of the Muslim community, eminently proper upbringing with her parents, her brother and her sisters in East London. It is difficult for a white judge to understand, let alone to articulate, the depth of the shock which the mother’s family suffered and of the shame which she brought upon it, as well as upon herself, by running away with and marrying a Sikh man.​[58]​

	Jivraj and Herman​[59]​ criticized the way in which the judge, in this case, due to a lack of understanding of religious practices, concluded that it was in the child's best interests to have his Sikh names informally changed to Muslim names, but not for this to be done officially by deed poll, and in relation to circumcision authorized it in the absence of any real discussion. In an analysis of several English legal decisions involving parents of different “cultures”, they argue that judgments tend to fall into three types:

(1) as belief and ritual practice; (2) as racial genetic marker; and (3) as culture and personal identity. The first approach prioritises a child's intellectual capacity to understand the meaning of belief and ritual; the second prioritises a 'racial' or ethnic lineage; and the third applies a more context-oriented perspective in order to determine a child's cultural identity.​[60]​ 

	Jivraj and Herman state that such judgments reflect the judge’s Orientalism and assert in their conclusion:

So, for example, an understanding of 'Jewish', 'Muslim', or 'Sikh' as 'religion' narrowly defined through the prioritisation of belief/practice and cognitive processing can result in the de facto conversion of non-Christian children to Christianity, which itself remains invisible; if spoken of at all, it is called 'secularism'. Those cases that prioritised blood and genetic ancestry exhibit a racialised logic that the first set of cases largely does not. Here, 'Jewish', 'Muslim', or 'Sikh' are de-theologised, and, instead, ethnicised, resulting in a complex relationship between the 'religious' and the 'racial'. While, through the language of ethnicity, the children's authentic heritage is judicially identified as being 'in the blood', it is possible, according to some of the judges, to de-couple race and religion. Thus, a Jew by virtue of her 'blood' (per Ward LJ in Re P), or a Sikh by virtue of his 'genetic[s]' (per Wilson J in Re S), can become Christian, or Muslim, by religion, but they will never lose their racial make-up, they will always and forever remain Jewish or Sikh by race. In Re B, 'Muslim' and 'Gambian' appear similarly racialised and deemed to live forever 'in the blood'.

	Some judges however have been attuned to the possibility that their own subjective position is overly subjective and may inform their judgments and have consciously resisted, on the one hand, Orientalism and, on the other, kowtowing to the bane of custom. Munby LJ in self- examination mode and reflecting on the need for a legal cultural relativism that is not simply uncritical, steering a course between a blind cultural relativism and a presumptive Orientalism, in Singh v Entry Clearance Officer New Delhi (2004) says:

... in our multi-cultural and pluralistic society the family takes many forms. Indeed, in contemporary Britain the family takes an almost infinite variety of forms. Many marry according to the rites of non-Christian faiths. There may be one, two, three or more generations living together under the same roof. Some people choose to live on their own. People live together as couples, married or not, and with partners who may not always be of the opposite sex. Children live in households where their parents may be married or unmarried. They may be the children of polygamous marriages. They may be brought up by a single parent. Their parents may or may not be their natural parents. Their siblings may be only half siblings or step siblings. Some children are brought up by a single parent. Some children are brought up by parents of the same sex. Some children are conceived by artificial donor insemination. Some are the result of surrogacy arrangements. The fact is that many adults and children, whether through choice or circumstance, live in families more or less removed from what until comparatively recently would have been recognised as the typical nuclear family.​[61]​

	Munby J, again in Singh, powerfully articulates the need to move away from arrogating any one faith above any other in determining matters related to the child:

Although historically this country is part of the Christian west, and although it has an established church which is Christian, we sit as secular judges serving a multi-cultural community of many faiths in which all of us can now take pride. We are sworn to do justice ‘to all manner of people’. Religion- whatever the particular believer’s faith-is no doubt something to be encouraged but it is not the business of government or of the secular courts, though the courts will, of course, pay every respect and give great weight to a family’s religious principles. Article 9 of the Convention, after all, demands no less. So the starting point of the law is a tolerant indulgence to cultural and religious diversity and an essentially agnostic view of religious beliefs. A secular judge must be wary of straying across the well-recognised divide between church and state.​[62]​

	Ryder J, in Haringey LBC v C and E and another intervening (2006),​[63]​ also navigated these difficult waters with enormous care and caution in a difficult case, being sensitive to custom whilst not letting it become a metanorm. In this case the parents claimed the child had been born as a result of a miracle birth. The local authority applied for the child to be taken into care in order to protect him, for being raised in a family which lived in this fiction would be harmful to the child’s understanding of the world. Ryder J opined:

Religious, racial and cultural factors are integral elements of welfare and may on the facts of a particular case provide both the positive and negative factors and context by and within which decisions have to be made ... the law does not give any religious belief or birthright a pre-eminent place in the balance of factors that compromise welfare ... Furthermore the safeguarding of the welfare of vulnerable children and adults ought not to be subordinated by the court to any particular religious belief.​[64]​

Critiquing Legal Cultural Relativism – Claims of Patriarchy

Legal cultural relativism however in accommodating other cultural perspectives has in its myopia myopic and quest for political correctness reproduced entrenched systems of masculinism. Even the Grandmasters, Said and Cannadine, in their different ways, underestimated gender in their theorizing.​[65]​ Said’s occlusion surfaces in an interview with Raymond Williams,​[66]​ where both writers reveal a minimalistic regard for women/gender in the world order. Said opines: “I really do feel that in that situation (Imperialism and Orientalism) in the relationships between the ruler and the ruled in the imperial or the colonial or racial sense, race takes precedence over both class and gender”.​[67]​ As for Williams, he believes only overt and intentional acts to be the real onesopen to scrutiny and judgement. “As for the issue of gender, well, I think the way people see suppression is always important, because I have never been conscious of suppressing gender”.​[68]​ Cultural relativism has been responsible for systematic eschewing of some serious suffering and discrimination against women. For example, women victims of domestic violence have not been protected for fear that state intervention may interfere with family values and culture, and in addition, until recently, male defendants’ cultural excuses for violence have been treated sympathetically in deference to cultural relativism.​[69]​ This tendency has resulted in the strategy of non-interference at the one end of the continuum to the development of a “cultural defense” at the other. In the application of legal cultural relativism, the position of women and of mothers and indeed of children becomes subordinated to patriarchy which is a redolent feature of all cultural and customary practice. 
     There are some examples however where the bane of patriarchal custom is robustly criticized by the courts. For example, in K (FC) and another v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2006),​[70]​ a case involving two asylum seekers, in respect of the second appellant (Fornah) a young girl who sought asylum to escape FGM, from Sierra Leone, Baroness Hale said that custom “is the province of the Chiefs, and many of these men serve actively as patrons of initiation ceremonies”.​[71]​ Justice Albie Sachs  in the South African case, Minister of Home Affairs and another v Fourie and another; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and others v Minister of Home Affairs and others (2005),​[72]​  (​http:​/​​/​www.lexisnexis.com​/​uk​/​legal​/​results​/​enhdocview.do?docLinkInd=true&ersKey=23_T19797124426&format=GNBFULL&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=0_T19797173526&backKey=20_T19797173527&csi=274794&docNo=12" \t "​)in a rejection of blind patriarchy asserted: “Patriarchy at least as old as most marriage systems, defended as being based on biological fact and which was supported by many a religious leader, is no longer accepted as the norm, at least in large parts of the world”.​[73]​ In PO (Trafficked Women) Nigeria CG (2009), ​[74]​ the court recognized the obstacles facing women:

Accommodation will be difficult for the appellant. Single women, no matter how wealthy, find it difficult to rent properties for accommodation and exercise their rights as men would do. This is due to the age-long patriarchy and gender-bias against women.​[75]​

	Patriarchy is a significant component of custom and culture which asserts itself particularly where there are inter jurisdictional disputes.

Whose Claims Prevail in International Relocation from West to East?

	These cultural considerations, dilemmas, and questions all collide in custody claims where one parent wishes to relocate to another country. How does the court navigate this complex landscape? First, there are cases where relocation and custody arise between different but more or less comparable jurisdictions (at least with regard to the way in which children’s rights and gender rights are articulated). Second, there are cases where the two jurisdictions are significantly different and where in the foreign jurisdiction the rights of children and of women are subordinate. Indeed, the most formidable challenge to the family courts is presented where parents wish to reside in a jurisdiction with conflicting approaches to women as mothers and to children’s rights. The principles guiding international relocation disputes have considered bonding of carer and child as central; quintessential to this is the mother’s well-being. In Payne v Payne (2001)​[76]​ where a mother was granted leave to relocate to New Zealand, the father appealed the order to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal in dismissing the appeal took the opportunity to lay down principles to be followed in such cases, including: the welfare of the child is always paramount; no presumption is created by s.13(1)(b) Children Act 1989 in favor of the applicant parent; the reasonable proposals of the parent with a residence order wishing to live abroad carry great weight; the proposals have to be scrutinized with care and the court needs to be satisfied that there is a genuine motivation for the move and not the intention to bring contact with the other parent to an end; the effect upon the child of the denial of contact with the other parent and, in some cases, his or her family is very important; the opportunity for continuing contact between the child and the parent left behind may be very significant.
	As the law developed following Payne, the courts seemed to favor mothers over fathers. In Re L (Shared Residence Order) (2009)​[77]​ the court took the view that the children's loss of contact with their mother would be akin to a bereavement. Case law reflects two lines of authority. The first follows the Payne principles; the second considers the justice and fairness of depriving a father of his children and the children of their father.​[78]​ In trying to offer some international and comprehensive guidance in March 2010, the Washington Declaration on International Family Relocation was agreed, establishing a series of principles.​[79]​ The courts have in many cases focused on the bond between mother and child in arriving at a decision to allow a child to leave the country and locate abroad. In Re F (2012)​[80]​ the family were Spanish, the child was 7 years old and living in the United Kingdom with the father, and the mother was in Spain. The mother applied for the child to be reunited with her in Spain. It is to be noted that whilst in the past the language of “primary carer” and “shared residence” might have been used as a bargaining tool in relocation disputes, Munby LJ said the language was not very helpful. The mother’s application was granted and the appeal dismissed. In S v T (Permission to Relocate to Russia) (2012)​[81]​ the court agreed to the mother’s relocating to Russia provided that contact arrangements were conditional upon her obtaining an order from the Russian court based on the contact proposals. In TC (Children) (Relocation) (2013)​[82]​ where a mother wished to relocate with her children to Australia, the court per Mostyn LJ said that there was no presumption either way. He came down in favor of relocation; concluding in his judgment thus: 

Child abduction seldom, if ever, has a happy ending. It has rightly been described as a form of child abuse. The Mother’s conduct was abysmal. It was an act of deliberate cruelty to her Husband, the Father of her children. It was directly contrary to the interests of the children for them abruptly to be removed from the society of their Father. It has subjected them to 2 years of uncertainty while they have been taken across the world, back and forth. It has embroiled all members of the family in extensive litigation with days in court in both countries. It has brought the Mother to the brink of bankruptcy. Yet it has not been until very recently that the Mother has developed any self-awareness. Her attitude was ‘I did not abduct them; I just took them home’. This is an all too common attitude but it is as misguided as it is futile. If the place to which the children are taken is a subscriber to the Hague Convention (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Hague_Convention_on_the_Civil_Aspects_of_International_Child_Abduction​) then the children will almost inevitably be returned with all the delay and heartbreak that this case has demonstrated. Had the Mother behaved correctly and made an application for relocation in 2011 then I expect it would likely have been granted, and all that trauma avoided.

	And so, this first consideration has focused on the relationship and bond between the parent and the child.Yet there are other considerations.

Imagining the East: Orientalism or Ignorance

Where the parents, however, are from divergent jurisdictions with different cultures and customs, the courts cannot ignore this context. However tThe way in which Western judges understand the East may unfairly influence their judgments regarding relocation when a one parent is from the East. Judges may be influenced by their perceptions of the East. Said​[83]​ argues that the problem lies with the West’s representation of the East that which  gives way to our thinking on the East as under developed and not as civilized, as we,promulgating a view of the East as an imagined community.​[84]​ The fact that the two “civilisations” are presented in the dominant discourse as locked in struggle does not aid understanding. Karim​[85]​ has argued that: “Much of the interaction between Western and Muslim societies is characterized by a mutual lack of awareness regarding history and culture”. The misunderstandings are many.
Asani’s claims that the problems are in part due to the West’s “religious illiteracy”​[86]​ on any  faith and belief other than their own.provides a new way of examining the differences in general terms and also in family law. De Sousa points out that argues that contested meanings become eradicated  by the dominant constructors of knowledge and understanding such that “Cultural imperialism and epistemicide are part of the historical trajectory of Western modernity”.​[87]​Another problem is seeingA further problem is the way in which communities whose dominant faith is Islamic are misrepresented as in some way identical, homogenous, fixed, abstracted, objectified and reified (in the example of Bahrain below, as just one example, Sunni and Shi’a family law contain their own differences in one country). This reductionist thinking on the “other” dominates perspectives and spills over into the understanding of the position of women and especially their position in family law. Nawal Saadawi, writing on Western feminism from an Arab woman’s subject position, asserts that: “Influential circles, particularly in the Western imperialist world, depict the problems of Arab women as stemming from the substance and values of Islam, and simultaneously depict the retarded development of Arab countries in many important areas as largely the result of religious and cultural factors, or even inherent characteristics in the mental and psychic constitution of the Arab peoples”.​[88]​ It is also the case that Western feminism, in rejecting the Orientalist essentialism, has in its preference for multi-culturalism ignored some real problems. Gita Saghal​[89]​ has trenchantly critiqued “white feminism” for eclipsing the problems, for example, inherent in Asian forced marriages, in preference for supporting the dominant left positions on anti-racism. These perceptions may also influence judicial thinking in inter- jurisdictional custody disputes between East and West.

Natural Law: Middle Eastern Omnipotent Father

	Where the disputes are between East and West, it is undeniable for some at least that there are unacceptable differences and, whereand where relocating the child may mean relocation to a country where children’s rights and women’s gender rights are subordinated and where the prevailing legal approach to parental authority conflicts with legal principles applicable in the United Kingdom, such “cultural matters” are difficult to ignore. Whilst the dynamic “West” may not hold the key to transcendent truth and justice, culture, and tradition and their impact on family law in some countries in the East are is problematic. In the internationally acclaimed Iranian film, “Nader and Simmin”,​[90]​ where the parents separate and the wife wishes to leave the husband and wants custody of her eleven year old daughter, Termeh, the legal position is made abundantly clear: custody is the father’s prerogative. The film explores the patriarchal right to custody as well as other aspects relating to gender roles within a rigid Islamic patriarchal society the importance of bonding mother to child as expressed in Payne v Payne (above) would be irrelevant..  
	Conflicting principles clash where one party wishes to remain in the United Kingdom and the other wishes to relocate to a Middle Eastern jurisdiction with the child of the family. The West may have rejected the natural law claims of the father and the rule in Agar Ellis may be dead, but the Middle East and its family law are predicated on the rule of the father. And so, whereas gender equality, children’s rights, and family rights in the West are articulated around the Convention provisions of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, UNCRC (Article 16), and CEDAW (Article 16), such principles are largely irrelevant to Eastern claims espousing a father as the natural guardian and custodian. At this juncture we do not propose to undertake a comprehensive study of patriarchal power in family law in Middle Eastern jurisdictions; instead an overview of the custody rights template and the relevance of  a woman’s conduct to any residual claim are considered.
	In Middle Eastern jurisdictions, the father is the natural custodian, and the rights of the mother and the rights of the child are subordinate. Across the Middle East, from Morocco, to Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Yemen, Bahrain, and so on, legal scholars have explored the position of women and the impact of their subordinated status on their rights to custody and, in turn, the child’s right to know and be raised by both parents. Rights to child custody favor men. Typically across this region a male child remains with the mother until he is seven, and then custody becomes the automatic right of the father. The mother’s place in raising the child until that age can become dislodged, however. For example, remarriage is not an option unless the mother is prepared to relinquish her children, because remarriage results in forfeiture of her young children. Similarly, conduct may also result in her giving up her children. 
	Moreover, laws regarding family life, including the fact that a woman cannot confer her citizenship on her children, are all designed to uphold marriage within kinship or cultural groups and to prohibit women from second marriages. The fact that non-Muslim wives do not have the same kinds of status as Muslim wives provides some further evidence of all wives’ inferior status. There are variations and modifications to this patriarchal Sharia template across the region, but the mother is certainly never placed on an equal footing with the father with regard to parenthood and custody. Many Middle Eastern countries have not ratified international human rights instruments or else, if they are parties, have entered reservations. For example, Saudi Arabia ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1996, but with a reservation “with respect to all such articles as are in conflict with the provisions of Islamic law”. Reservations are entered on the basis that this and other declarations conflict with domestic law and custom. Other Middle Eastern countries have followed in this vein, particularly with regard to CEDAW (Article 16(1)(f)). Thus, the right of the child to parents and of parents to the custody of the child is interpreted through local law and the overarching doctrine of patriarchal interpretation of Sharia. The question arises to what extent should any of this be considered as a factor when a British judge is deciding a matter of international relocation involving a Middle Eastern country? 

Women’s Conduct Compromising their Custody Rights

	This subjugation of the mother in personal family law across the region has been the basis of calls for reform for several decades. In Morocco, for example, Fatima Mernissi​[91]​ has campaigned for years to change the laws and customs which have sanctioned and reproduced women’s inferior status. The problems are replicated throughout the region with regard to restrictions on the right to custody which are dependent on the child’s age and gender. In Algeria, Articles 65 and 186, as amended in 2005, a mother’s custody rights for a male child end when he reaches age 10 years, and for the female when she reaches the age of marriage. If a mother remarries in these jurisdictions, she loses her right to custody of her children and visitation rights may be restricted.​[92]​Article 146 of the Egyptian personal status law asserts that the mother’s custody period ends when a boy is nine and a girl is 11.​[93]​ For countries in the Gulf region, as Munira Fakhro observes,​[94]​ “Family law is the key issue ... and custody in the Gulf is determined by Islamic law ... the mother [has] custody of [her] daughter until [her] daughter [is] nine and [her] son eleven ...”. In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), under Sharia law and in accordance with the Personal Status Law passed in 2005, a Muslim mother may be granted custody of girls under the age of nine and boys under the age of seven, at which time custody may be transferred to the father.​[95]​ In accordance with the Personal Status Law passed in 2006, Article 173 of the Qatari family law asserts that a mother’s custody terminates when a male is 12 and a female is 15; the custodian mother should not be married to a foreigner to the child, and she must raise the children as Muslim in order to retain custody.​[96]​ Bahraini law sets mothers’ custody right to end at fifteen for the male ward, and for the female at seventeen or on consummation of marriage, with wards who have reached those ages.​[97]​ The Family Law promulgated by Legislative Decree No (19) of 2009 is Bahrain’s first codified family law.​[98]​ In Kuwait, Article 194 of the Personal Status Law provides that a woman’s custody of the male child ends at puberty and of a girl when she is married; she loses custody rights if she remarries.​[99]​ In addition, for example in Saudi Arabia,  men and women who wish to marry a foreigner must obtain permission from the Interior Ministry; custody rights in the event of divorce are more likely to pass to the paternal grandparents should the father be unsuitable.​[100]​ In reflecting on these additional proscriptions one sees Ayelet Shachar’s​[101]​ thesis in practice, whereby: “various religions (and national) communities have used marriage and divorce regulation in the same way that modern states have used citizenship law: to delineate clearly who is inside and who is outside of the collective”.​[102]​

Conduct of Mothers: Further Compromises

	In addition to these provisions regulating a mother’s custody rights, her conduct is a key factor in compromising any minimal rights she might have. (Iin the film “Nader and Simin” Razieh comes into the home of Nader to care for Nader’s father who has Alzheimer’s, but she is afraid to tell her own husband of her employment because entering into the house of an old man, and staying there on her own  albeit she is caring for him, is not permitted. Indeed, when alone with the elderly man who wets himself, she phones a Mullah for advice as to whether it is a sin to change the old man’s trousers). In Kuwait, according to the personal status law, the mother loses her rights under Article 191: “...when she marries a man who is a Mahram”. A Mahram is “someone who is prohibited from marrying her”.​[103]​ Her “moral” conduct may affect her rights to custody, for example, if she has been convicted of a crime similar to an “honor misdemeanor”. 
	The following cases before the Court of Cassation illustrate the impact that a mothers “conduct” has on custody matters. In Case No. 145/2003, issued on 28-4-2004,​[104]​ the mother lost custody of her children because she was convicted of forging the signature of her husband in order to cash a cheque. In Case No. 133/2001, issued on 30-12-2001, the mother said that she found the husband in the house with another woman. The husband counter-claimed and said that the wife was having an affair. Although the father’s conduct was said still to be under investigation, it was the mother who lost custody of her children because she was accused of having an affair out of wedlock with a man. She was charged in the criminal court although subsequently acquitted for lack of evidence. The Family Court judge based his ruling upon her confession to the prosecutor during the investigation stage, which she said she was coerced into giving. The Family Court judge cited this admission and her previous refusal to allow the father to meet up with the children as reasons to give the father sole custody. 
	In Case No. 256/2000, issued on 3-11-2001, the mother was the victim of physical and mental abuse by the husband and applied for custody of the child. The husband in his counterclaim accused the wife of sleeping with another man. Although the case was never presented in the criminal courts and so she was never officially accused of anything, the family court judge based his judgment on “the mother's ill repute and infamous behaviour”. The family judge did not dispute the acquittal, but nevertheless relied on the unproven allegation as a basis for finding against her custody application and ruling that she was unsuitable to be a custodian to her children. In Case No. 118/98, issued on 13-2-1999, the mother applied for custody and the father counter claimed alleging that she had allowed herself to be alone with a stranger, and allowed him to come into the marital home without the permission or knowledge of the husband. She was charged in the criminal courts.  Although she was subsequently acquitted, the family judge found her to be an unsuitable to be a custodian of her children. 
	In Bahrain, a mother’s right to custody is similarly fragile as the following cases reported by the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights demonstrate.​[105]​

Custody -A husband and wife, with two children, filed a case in 2008 against their son-in-law claiming he was violent with his daughter and refused to allow her to visit her family.  Another case was filed from the wife after her husband was jailed repeatedly for drug use and fighting. A divorce was granted in 2010.According to Sharia law, the boys aged 10 and 12 are in the custody of their father even though he is in jail. The wife filed a case in April 2013 to fight for the custody of the children, arguing that the father is not in acceptable shape to care for the children as he is scheduled to serve in prison until 06/12/2013.The case was rejected, and the boys remained in the custody of their jailed father.  Child Visitation Rights-A Bahraini mother was divorced in 2005; she was divorced when her daughter was only 2 months old. Since the divorce, the daughter lived with her and her grandmother. The mother passed away in April 2011 after the uprising and left her daughter with her grandmother. The father then took his daughter custody, and refused to permit her mother’s family to see her. The grandmother filed a case to see her granddaughter, who lived with her since she was born. The verdict was to allow her to see grandmother every weekend from Thursday to Saturday afternoon. Till 2013 the grandmother is unable to see her granddaughter and she filed [several] cases but the father refuses to obey the verdict. October 2013 the young girl filed a case, requesting to live with her grandmother, as she never knew or lived with her father before her mother’s death. The case is still currently open.​[106]​

Judicial Navigation between West and East

	In international custody cases, whether arising from asylum or international relocation between the United Kingdom and the Middle East, the welfare test is considered against a backdrop of obligations including the factual matrix of gender inequality and patriarchy and the lack of recognition of children’s rights, women’s rights, and homosexual rights, which characterizes other judicial systems into which a child may be relocated. Do judges adopt an Orientalist view of the East or of Eastern culture, as Jivraj and Herman exploredfound with regard to deciding domestic specific issues which arose between parent in the raising of  their children within the UK jurisdiction and where different cultural backgrounds arose between the parenting couples were themselves from different cultural backgrounds, or are judges multi-culturalist, taking a relativist view that all cultures are different and provided the child is bonded to a parent, such differences in law and ways of life are not properly matters for them and the court should not interfere?​[107]​ Or do they adopt a view that other cultures nay may be different, but gender inequality runs against Hague Abduction Convention rights as does eschewing the rights of the child and thus cannot be countenanced. As has already been established, any decision with regard to family law and child custody that is made in the United Kingdom must be made in a way that is compatible with the development of the law and with Convention rights. Thus, for example, a mother’s conduct has little role in custody matters in the West unless it interferes with her ability to properly raise the child or interferes with the ability of a parent to care for the child, nor is the sexual orientation of the parent relevant.. In addition, the European Convention on Human Rights and the particular construction of family life under Article 8 and the construction of the right to be free from discrimination under Article 14 are relevant.
	In the film Saudi Arabian film “Wadjda” (2010), directed by Haifaa Al-Mansour,10-year-old Wadjda (​http:​/​​/​www.theguardian.com​/​film​/​movie​/​149734​/​wadjda" \o "More from the Guardian on Wadjda​) is a lower-middle-class schoolgirl in Riyadh whose parents are about to separate. She is a free -spirited and her behaviour clearly departs fromrejects and contests the societal norms imposed on girls of her age. She wants to ride a bicycle and only recites the Koran perfectly because she wants to win the prize money to buy a bike. Her mother is virtually imprisoned in the home in a very specific form of purdah. The public spaces are not for women (as I also found when I visited Saudi Arabia; no cafe could be entered, no seat could be sat on, and no toilet was readily available. Food was eaten in a hotel behind a curtain).​[108]​ Women are not allowed to drive, so Wadjda (​http:​/​​/​www.theguardian.com​/​film​/​movie​/​149734​/​wadjda" \o "More from the Guardian on Wadjda​)’s mother depends on the chauffeur for everything outside the home. The spirited Wadjda, in quiet defiance of gender subversion, challenges attempts to crush and silence and mold her. She does not care that men might see her or that her headscarf is not properly sitting on her head or covering her hair. IndeedEngaging in , apparently small acts of resistance, the type of shoes she wears, the color of her socks, the fact that she allows herself to run playfully down the street with a male boy her own age, loom large inare all carefully orchestrated in her attempts to survive as an independent autonomous  “Gillick competent” (above) child. Yet she is told by Miss Hussa, her teacher, “Your behaviour will haunt you forever”. From a young age she is to learn that conduct is everything and that her conduct can destroy her!

	In Re J (A Child) (2005),​[109]​ the father was from Saudi Arabia and the mother from Iraq. The mother moved from Saudi Arabia with her son to the United Kingdom to pursue a Master’s degree. Her marriage had encountered difficulties, and she later filed for a divorce in the United Kingdom. The father in turn filed an application requiring the child to be returned to Saudi Arabia. Judge Hughes in the Principal Registry held on balance, were it not for one factor that he would have found it in the child’s best interests to be returned to Saudi Arabia for his future to be decided “according to the norms of his own society”.​[110]​ That one factor related to allegations, albeit subsequently withdrawn, that the father had raised about the mother’s association with another man. The court heard that such allegations would be particularly damaging to the child if raised in Saudi Arabia. Expert evidence on this point had been admitted on the effect of such allegations on family and reputation in Saudi Arabian society. The expert was “... seriously concerned that an occasion will arise in which [the child’s] interests are seriously damaged by a dispute between the parents in which the father deploys complaints of this kind and they have the dramatic effects that they would have in Saudi Arabia”.​[111]​ 
	The father appealed and the Court of Appeal reversed the decision.​[112]​ It said this “that there could be no criticism of the judge’s ‘impeccable direction’ on the applicable legal principles”. Nevertheless, it allowed the father’s appeal on the ground that the judge had “elevated this specific anxiety above a level that the evidence justified”.​[113]​ Accordingly, it should not have had such a decisive effect in what had earlier been described as an otherwise balanced judgment. The mother did not agree and appealed to the House of Lords, which allowed the appeal and restored the orders made by the trial judge. Baroness Hale, who delivered the majority judgment in a “mistressful” balancing act, suggested a liberal multi-cultural view akin to Arendt’s “enlarged mentality”, asserting: “The issue, therefore, is how, if at all, it is relevant that the laws and procedures in the country to which the child is to be returned are very different from those which would apply if the child’s future were to be decided here”.​[114]​ She later expressed a confidence in the United Kingdom judicial system to deal with cultural and religious factors. She set out to make a firm stand against presuming any Orientalist inclination: “It does not follow, therefore, that a Saudi Muslim boy who is mainly cared for by nannies and nursery schools will be better off living with his mother and maternal grandparents in multi-cultural London than with his father or some other female relative in his home country”.​[115]​ Baroness Hale reminded us that in a world of different values, one culture is not to be preferred to another.​[116]​ 

But she also in a later breath reminded us of our own Convention obligations: ‘The importance of article 20 is that it asks whether what might happen in the foreign country would be permitted under those fundamental principles were it to happen here ... In this country, it would not be acceptable to distinguish automatically between father and mother in their relationship with their children. Non-discrimination between the sexes is a fundamental principle of our law ... Any discrimination in the foreign country which was contrary to article 14 of the Convention on Human Rights would allow, but not require, the court to refuse to return the child. This consideration serves to reinforce the view that the legal system in the foreign country cannot be irrelevant to the issue of summary return’.​[117]​

	In B v El-B (Abduction: Sharia Law: Welfare of Child) (2003)​[118]​ a Lebanese mother brought the children, aged 5 and 3, to England in breach of an order of the Lebanese court which restrained the mother from taking the children out of Lebanon or leaving the country herself. The case was brought under wardship jurisdiction, as Lebanon was not a signatory to the Hague Abduction Convention. The welfare of the child had to be considered. Both parents were devout Muslims, and this was the cultural background of the children. Under Muslim law, the transfer of legal custody of children from mother to father takes place at the ages of seven (for boys) and nine (for girls); hence the mother understandably feared that the patriarchal rights of the father would soon be enforced and she would lose custody. Peter Hughes QC (sitting as a deputy High Court judge) found that there was no basis in the suggestion that Sharia law was not to be regarded as child-centered. Adopting a multi-cultural relativism, he ordered the return of the children: 

[30] The approach to the welfare and upbringing of children, where the relationship between their parents breaks down and they are unable to agree on what is in the best interests of the children, is very different in Muslim countries from our own approach. It does not necessarily follow, though, that it is not child-centred. Simply, that Muslim countries, which apply Sharia law, have different philosophies, customs and practices to our own … [35] It can be seen, therefore, that the approach is very different to our own, but it would not be right, simply by reason of that fact, to conclude that it is not concerned with the welfare of the child … [59] She says that she came here because she was afraid that she would lose the children and not receive justice in Lebanon, and that she fears that were she to return she could be prosecuted and lose her liberty, which would have a harmful effect on the children and create an intolerable situation .... [60]. The assertion that she would be denied justice in Lebanon is a bare assertion that is unsupported by evidence. 

	In Re JA (1998),​[119]​ the family had lived in England for substantial periods. The father was a citizen of the United Arab Emirates and the mother was English. J was born in 1995 in the UAE and was of dual nationality. The family came to England in 1996, and later that year the mother said she wanted to stay in England. She issued divorce proceedings, and the father issued an originating summons in wardship seeking the peremptory return of the child upon various undertakings. The expert’s report spoke of harm to the mother and child if return to the United Arab Emirates were ordered. The court said that, “A careful review of the welfare issues might lead to a refusal to return an abducted child in certain cases, but it was not an outright rejection of Sharia law”. Singer J in the Court of first instance had refused return, and the Court of Appeal upheld his refusal. He spoke in terms of gender disadvantages, thus taking into account gender subversion of the mother as a significant factor in consideration of the welfare principle. The judge said the mother was: “… at the considerable personal disadvantage that she will be very vulnerable to the authority of the father, without whose active agreement her ability to do quite routine things may be prejudiced … The mother's ability to take the child outside the Emirates seems likely to depend entirely upon the father's grant or withholding of consent”.​[120]​
	 In EM Lebanon,​[121]​ the husband subjected the wife to violence. Her son, AF, was born in July 1996. EM divorced her husband in Lebanon because of his violence and, in 2003, left Lebanon and applied for asylum because if she returned to Lebanon she feared her son would be subjected to the rule that upon divorce, the father of the son would automatically become the custodian when the child attained seven years of age. As AF approached the age of seven, EM began trying to leave Lebanon to avoid having him taken from her. After his seventh birthday, she lived in hiding. The adjudicator, the asylum and immigration tribunal, and the Court of Appeal dismissed her case on the basis that if even if she did not have custody she would nevertheless have visitation rights. The House of Lords held that there had been a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and, whilst there was no pre-determined model of family or family life to which Article 8 was to be applied, the facts of the particular case were crucialsignificant. In the instant case there had been no familial contact between EM and her husband since the birth of AF, and AF had never seen his father since the day he was born. Nor had he had any contact with any of his father's relatives so that, realistically, the only family which existed or had existed for the previous five years consisted of EM and AF. It was plain that the family law applied in Lebanon would breach Article 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court concluded that a return would vitiate, deny, and nullify family life.
	As Lord Bingham noted, “Lebanon is not a party to the European Convention and this court has no standing to enforce observance of other international instruments to which Lebanon is a party”.
	Lord Hope, however, identified the interrelation between the child and the mother’s rights: “the close relationship that exists between mother and child up to the age of custodial transfer cannot survive under that system of law where ... the parents of the child are no longer living together”.​[122]​ He further commented on gender subversion in Mahoney’esque terms: “Shari’a law as it applied in Lebanon was created by men and for men in a male dominated society ... there is no place in it for equal rights between men and women”.​[123]​ The House of Lords was mindful to conclude that the decision was not to suggest any attempt to “alleviate religious and cultural differences between their own laws and family laws of any alien country of origin”​[124]​ and was especially circumspect to assert that the court was not “passing judgment on the law of the institutions of any other state”.​[125]​ EM was decided on the Article 8 right to family life claims in the European Convention on Human Rights. It has been criticized on the basis that it failed to sufficiently consider Article 14 and the question of gender equality of the mother and her right to custody as an adjunct to the right of the child to have the mother as custodian. Judy Walsh​[126]​ asked why was it that the House in their reasoning seemed to conclude that a finding of discrimination under Article 14 entailed an impermissible evaluation of another country’s law. Discrimination in family law vis-a-vis custody arrangements is core, but, said Walsh,​[127]​ where the Strasbourg  court has determined that the primary provision in the case is that Article 8 has been breached, it does not go on to consider Article 14. Monaghan​[128]​ was also critical that the jurisprudence had centered on Article 8. She argued that because there is a fundamental right to equality and that gender equality is a peremptory norm, then the court should have considered Article 14: “There is no room in this area for adopting a relativist or tolerant approach to infringement of such fundamental rights, dependent on the place in which such infringement occurs”.​[129]​ Without a proper consideration of Article 14 in construing the “welfare of the child”, one is faced with what Mahoney has raised elsewhere that: 

Women have barely been visible in systems that create, interpret, and apply laws. If they serve women, it is in a derivative way - when they suffer violations in the same way as men. This privileges the male world-view and supports male dominance in the international order. Issues of concern to men are seen as general human concerns, while those of women are relegated to a specialised limited category of women’s rights that under analysis, do not amount to ‘human rights’ as we know them.​[130]​ 

	Pickup and Gask suggest that the House could be seen to tread lightly “because of the discriminatory nature of Lebanese family law, but have avoided saying as much because of the political sensitivity of the issue”.​[131]​ But it is certainly the case that a masculinist patriarchal version model of family life has passed intobeen accepted in  Eastern understanding as a universal standard and as an objective “natural” truth, whereas in reality it isthis patriarchal model is not fixed but socially created and what Gribich has called in another context “embodied imagination”.​[132]​

No Epilogia

	In considering matters of custody across continents, judges must consider the complex matrix and intersectionality of conflicting jurisdictional law, domestic law and convention rights which apply in the country in which the order(s) are being decided. Judges are required to move beyond the mere accommodation and consideration of different cultural practices   of faith,​[133]​ including questions of circumcision,​[134]​ faith schooling,​[135]​ and so on, all of which are factors they have considered and with which they are becoming more familiar when “mixed marriages” break down, to use Malins VC’s words in Agar Ellis.​[136]​ These questions do encourage judges to embrace different cultures in the way Munby LJ articulated in Singh, where life in the Middle East or life in Middle England comes into play. The application of the welfare test has rightly been criticized for being masticated through a paternal, patriarchal, heteronormative, and Orientalist lens. But it is too simplistic and reductionist to conclude that, when judges decide in favor of a parent in Middle England over a parent in the Middle East, they are impliedly Orientalist. As Monaghan​[137]​ has pointed out, not all that is cultural or Islamic, not all that is Western or indeed Christian, is necessarily good. Judges choosing Middle England over the Middle East may be impliedly eschewing the record of lack of women’s rights, mothers’ rights, and family rights that subsist in parts of the Middle East, as indeed was part of the reasoning in EM Lebanon. Certainly when considering international child custody cases, living in Middle England or the Middle East has drastically different consequences for the “life chances,”​[138]​ opportunities, as well as enjoyment of basic human rights, and especially equality for the girl child and for the female and homosexual parent. However, the judges need also to be reminded that the Middle East is far from being fixed or static or homogenous in its cultural practices.​[139]​ 
	The courts must find a space in their thinking which is open to a willingness to understand other jurisdictions whilst at the same time observing Convention rights,​[140]​ always remembering that the attachment and bonding of parent to child, child to parent must never be eclipsed, subordinated, or compromised in this balancing act. But would a judge permit a child to go with its mother with whom it has bonded to Damascus or to Iraq (at this time) when its father also makes a custody claim ,and is albeit somewhat of a distant father to the child and but lives in London? These cases provide for the judge the most difficult of all decisions especially when it is recognized that, at the same time, the outcome of international custody battles almost inevitably results in the absent parent or the parent left behind losing meaningful contact with the child.​[141]​




1



^1	  Deputy Dean of Law, Buckingham Law School; B.A.,M.A., Ph.D., LLM; Barrister, Door Tenant - 1 Gray’s Inn Square Chambers, London; Expert Witness and member, Expert Witness Institute; human rights campaigner and activist.
^2	  RE J (child returned abroad: convention rights) [2005] UKHL 40.
^3	  EM (Lebanon)v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 64.
^4	  Custody of Infants Act 1925.
^5	  See S. Edwards, Female Sexuality and the Law (1981). 
^6	  Re L (A Child) (Internal Relocation: Shared Residence Order) (2009) EWCA Civ 20.
^7	  Ibid., para [69].
^8	  Re F (Shared Residence Order) (2003) EWCA Civ 592, [2003] 2 FLR 397.
^9	  J. Austin, How to do Things with Words: The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955, ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà, (1962); see also Philosophical Papers 1961, eds. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (1979). See also Isaiah Berlin, et al., (eds.), Essays on J. L. Austin (1973).
^10	  Re F, note 8 above.
^11	  F. Engels, The Origin of the Family (1884).
^12	  Agar Ellis Re Agar-Ellis v Lascelles (1878) 10 Ch D 49, CA. (Agar Ellis No 1). See also Agar Ellis http://archive.thetablet.co.uk/article/13th-february-1864/13/marriage-of-the-hen-leopold-agar-ellis-mp-and-the-is  last accessed 2 April 2014. Attended  by Duke and Duchess of Sutherland, the Duchess of Manchester, Viscount Somerton, Lord and Lady Begot, Lady Constance Villiers, daughter of the Countess of Jersey. Etc). 
^13	  Ibid.
^14	  Agar-Ellis (No.2), Re Court of Appeal, 24 Ch D 317, , at 319 (24 July 1883). 
^15	  Ibid., p. 319.
^16	  Ibid., p. 323. See also Wellesley v Duke  of Beaufort (1828) II Bligh, N.S. 124. 4 E.R. 1078 HL, where the Court of Chancery had jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for infants, being Wards of the Court, excluding the father; and upon evidence that the father was living in a state of adultery, and had encouraged his children in swearing, keeping low company, etc.; it was held a fit case to exercise the power to exclude him from the guardianship.
^17	  Ibid., p. 335.
^18	  Ibid., p. 339.
^19	  Ibid., pp. 328-329.
^20	  Agar Ellis no 1.
^21	  Note 12 above, p. 58.
^22	  Ibid., p. 72. 
^23	  There is a considerable discourse and critique of what passes for common sense assumptions. See P. Berger and T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (1971). C. Geertz, “Common Sense as a Cultural System”, in Local Knowledge Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (1983). B. De Souza Santos, Towards a New Common Sense (1995).
^24	  Note 12 above, p. 56.
^25	  See Geertz, note 23 above.
^26	  R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1988), p. 362.
^27	  Cited in translator’s introduction to Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (1976), p. xv.
^28	  Butti Sultan Butti Ali Al-Muhairi, “Islamisation and Modernisation within the UAE Penal Law: Shari'a in the Pre-Modern Period”, Arab Law Quarterly, X (1995), p. 287.
^29	  Hewer v Bryant [1970)] 1 QB 357.
^30	  Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112.
^31	  Ibid.
^32	  Re L (A Child) (Internal Relocation: Shared Residence Order) (2009) EWCA Civ 20.
^33	  See the case of Case of X, Y and Z v. The United Kingdom (Application no. 21830/93)1997. See also Kantaras v. Kantaras 884 So. 2d 155 -2004.
^34	  R v E&F (Female Parents Known Father) (2010) 2 FLR 383.
^35	  Civil Partnership Act 2004 (by end of 2012 there were over 60,000 civil partnerships registered in the United Kingdom Office for National Statistics); see also Civil Partnership Review (England and Wales): a consultation, Department for Culture Media and Sport. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/274449/140122_CP_con_doc_pdf__docx.pdf  last accessed 27 April 2014.On 29 March 2014 the Same Sex Couples Act 2013 came into force.
^36	  T v T (2010) EWCA Civ 1366.
^37	  Note 30 above.
^38	  T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, International Legal Materials, XIX (1980), p. 1501.
^39	  Suhraiya Jivraj and Didi Herman, “It is difficult for a white judge to understand: Orientalism, racialisation, and Christianity in English child welfare cases”. Child and Family Law Quarterly (2009), p. 283.
^40	  Z. Sadar, Postmodernism and the Other (1998), p. 67.
^41	  John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859). 
^42	  S. Poulter, Ethnicity. Law and Human Rights (1990), p. 109.
^43	  M. D. A. Freeman, “Culture, Childhood and Rights”, 2011 The Family in law, V (2011), p 24.Michael Freeman http://www.mishpat.ac.il/files/650/3610/3618/3619.pdf    VOL 5:15 
^44	  See S. Benhabib, “Arendt, Politics, and the Self. I. Judgment and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Arendt's Thought”, Political Theory, XVI, no. 1 (February 1988), pp. 29-51.
^45	  E. Said, Orientalism (1977).
^46	  Freeman, note 43 above, p. 28.
^47	  [1996] EWCA Civ 1320; [1996] 2 FLR 441.
^48	  See M. Welstead, “ Children’s Rights or Parental Property”, Denning Law Journal (1996).
^49	  M. Welstead and S. Edwards, Family Law (4th ed.; 2013). 
^50	  Re KD (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access) [1988] 1 AC 806.
^51	  [1996] EWCA Civ 1320; [1996] 2 FLR 441.
^52	  Welstead and Edwards, note 49 above, p. 238.
^53	  Ibid.
^54	   Re B (A Minor) (Adoption Application) - [1995] 2 FCR 749, RE B (Adoption: Child's Welfare) [1995] 1 FLR 895.
^55	   Ibid.
^56	  Ibid., p. 902.
^57	  RE S (Change Of Names: Cultural Factors) [2001] 2 FLR 1005.
^58	  Ibid., p. 1006. 
^59	  Note 39 above. 
^60	  Ibid., p. 286.
^61	  Pawandeep Singh v Entry Clearance Officer, New Delhi Court of Appeal 30 July 2004 [2004] EWCA Civ 1075 [2005] 2 W.L.R. 325, para. 63.
^62	  Ibid., para 67.
^63	  Haringey London Borough Council v C, E and Another Intervening [2006] EWHC 1620 (Fam) [2007] 1 FLR 1035.
^64	  Ibid., para 4. High Court of Justice Family Division 12 November 2004Neutral Citation Number: [2004] EWHC 2580 (Fam) 2004 WL 2678551, Haringey London Borough Council v C, E and Another Intervening [2006] EWHC 1620 (Fam) [2007] 1 FLR 1035, para 36. Rather surprisingly perhaps, in Re E (a child) (fact-finding hearing: assessment of biological parents)[2011]EWHC 3453 according to Mr and Mrs O the child E was born as a result of a miracle birth  on 9 November 2010. See later The London Borough Of Hillingdon Applicant - and -  A O -and- A O -and- A By the child’s Guardian, Julie Green -and- DR R [2014] EWHC 75 (Fam)  where the court found that the local authority failed to make its case against the parents and that they were innocent victims having been duped, but the fact remained that “The Threshold Criteria required by Section 31 of the Children Act has clearly been crossed in circumstances and at the  hands of persons unknown”(para 85).
^65	  D. Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire (2002), pp. 88-89; E. Said, Culture and Imperialism (1994), p. 263. 
^66	  R. Williams, The Politics of Modernism (1989), p. 196.
^67	  Ibid., p.196.
^68	  Ibid., p. 194.
^69	  M. Inan, “Opening Doors”, in Against the Grain (1990), p. 26.
^70	  UKHL 46.
^71	  Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) v. K (FC) (Appellant) Fornah (FC) (Appellant) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent), p. 53. 
^72	  20 BHRC 368.
^73	  102.
^74	  UKIAT 00046.
^75	  Para. 105.
^76	  EWCA Civ 166.
^77	  EWCA Civ 20[2009] 1 FLR 1157.
^78	  Re W (Children) (Leave to Remove) (2008) EWCA Civ 538- relocation of mother and child to Sweden case.J v S (Leave to Remove) (2010) - relocation of mother and child to Japan.Re B (Leave to Remove) (2008) - relocation of mother and child to Germany.
^79	  In all applications concerning international relocation the best interests of the child should be the paramount (primary) consideration. Therefore, determinations should be made without any presumptions for or against relocation. In order to identify more clearly cases in which relocation should be granted or refused, and to promote a more uniform approach internationally, the exercise of judicial discretion should be guided in particular, but not exclusively, by the following factors listed in no order of priority. The weight to be given to any one factor will vary from case to case: the right of the child separated from one parent to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis in a manner consistent with the child’s development, except if the contact is contrary to the child’s best interest; the views of the child having regard to the child’s age and maturity; the parties’ proposals for the practical arrangements for relocation, including accommodation, schooling and employment; here relevant to the determination of the outcome, the reasons for seeking or opposing the relocation; any history of family violence or abuse, whether physical or psychological; the history of the family and particularly the continuity and quality of past and current care and contact arrangements;pre‐existing custody and access determinations; the impact of grant or refusal on the child, in the context of his or her extended family, education and social life, and on the parties; the nature of the inter‐parental relationship and the commitment of the applicant to support and facilitate the relationship between the child and the respondent after the relocation; whether the parties’ proposals for contact after relocation are realistic, having particular regard to the cost to the family and the burden to the child; the enforceability of contact provisions ordered as a condition of relocation in the State of destination; issues of mobility for family members; and any other circumstances deemed to be relevant by the judge.
^80	  EWCA 1364.
^81	  EWHC 4023 (Fam); [2013] 2 F.L.R. 457; [2013] Fam. Law 812.
^82	  EWHC 292 (Fam); [2013] 2 F.L.R. 484; [2013] Fam. Law 676.
^83	  E. W. Said Orientalism  (1978).
^84	   B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. (1983).
^85	  Karim H. Karim and Mahmoud Eid, “Clash of Ignorance”,  Global Media Journal (2012), p 9. 
^86	  Ali S. Asani, (2003) “So That You May Know One Another”: A Muslim American Reflects on Pluralism and Islam”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, MLXXXVIII, no. 1, pp. 40-51.
^87	  Note 23 above, p. 345.
^88	  N. El Saadawi, The Hidden Face of Eve (1980), p.i.
^89	   G. Saghal, ‘Fundamantalism and the Multiculturalist Fallacy”, in Against the Grain (1990), p. 17.
^90	  Nader and Simmin’ Jodaeiye Nader az Simin – “A Separation”,‎ directed by Asghar Farhadi. A Separation is a compelling drama about the dissolution of a marriage. 
^91	  Mia Yamani (ed.), Feminism and Islam: Legal and Literary Perspectives (1996); also see Munira Fakhro, “Gulf Women and Islamic Law”, in ibid., p. 251. See John Esposito, Women in Muslim Family Law (1982), p. 11.
^92	  See Ghada Karmi, “Women, Islam and Patriarchalism”, in Yamani, note 91 above, p. 71. 
^93	  Ibid., p. 64.
^94	  Fakhro, in Yamani, ibid.
^95	  http://www.international-divorce.com/uae_child_abduction.htmhttp://www.internationalfamilylawfirm.com/2012_11_01_archive.html custody. See also Lena-Maria Möller, “Custody Regulations in the United Arab Emirates: Legal Reforms and Social Realities” (Max Planck Private Law Research Paper No. 13/10), at http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/pubman/item/escidoc:1740042:8/component/escidoc:1834548/Max%20Planck%20Private%20Law%20Research%20Paper%20No.%2013%2010
^96	  The Bahrain Center for Human Rights:http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/BHR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_BHR_16373_E.pdfsee also http://www.internationalfamilylawfirm.com/2012_11_01_archive.html custody.
^97	  L. Welchmann, “Bahrain, Qatar, UAE: First time Family Law Codifications in Three Gulf States”, in Bill Atkin (ed.), International Survey of Family Law (2010), p. 173. 
^98	  B. Al Awadi, S. Al Mubarak, and A. Al Attawi, Women’s Rights in the Kuwaiti Personal Status Law and Bahraini Shari’a Judicial Rulings (2009), p. 184. See also “The Battle Over Family Law in Bahrain”, Middle East Report, No. 242 (Spring 2007) for further  discussion on the Shi’a struggle for family law in a Shi’a populated country where the ruling family are Sunni and where Sunni Sharia Family law is imposed.
^99	  Ibid., p. 64.
^100	  E. A. Doumato, Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa (2005), p. 90.
^101	  A. Shachar, “The Puzzle of Interlocking Power Hierarchies: Sharing the Pieces of Jurisdictional Authority”,Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, XXXV (Summer 2000).
^102	  Ibid., p. 394.
^103	  Al Awadi, et al., note 98 above, pp. 62-63.
^104	  I am indebted to Dr. K. Al Bader,(DPhil University of  Leeds, UK)  Lecturer at the PAAET, Kuwait, for assistance in locating these cases and to A. R. B. Dashti for assistance in translation.
^105	  See http://www.zeenatalmansoori.com/articles/ARTICLE-Bahrain_Family_Law.pdfLast accessed 26 April 2014.
^106	  Ibid.
^107	  See Osman v Elasha [2000] Fam 62, [1999] 2 FLR 642, the court asserted “the importance of according to each State liberty to determine the family justice system and principles that it deems appropriate to protect the child and to serve his best”. 
^108	  See Susan Edwards, “Law professor and activist urges women in Saudi Arabia to drive towards equality”, atProfessor Susan Edwards, Wednesday, 19 October 2011: http://www.journal-online.co.uk/article/7942-wheels_fire
^109	  RE J (child returned abroad: convention rights) [2005] UKHL 40. 
^110	  Ibid., para. [67].
^111	  Ibid., para. [64].
^112	  Re J (A Child) (Return to Foreign Jurisdiction: Convention Rights) [2004] EWCA Civ 417, [2004] 2 FLR 85.
^113	  Ibid., para. [19], [6].
^114	  Re J (a child) (FC)[2005] UKHL 40 Para [14].
^115	  Ibid., para. [41].
^116	  See also Re M (Abduction: Zimbabwe) (2007). Baroness Hale said that the welfare of the child would need to be balanced against swift return and respect for one another’s judicial processes.
^117	  Para. [45]. I have had cause to re examine my original position on this case  I wrote in Welstead and Edwards, Family Law (2013): “the House of Lords was perhaps overly influenced by the claims of those wishing to depict a small and reactionary sector of a Saudi society as the societal template”. I no longer hold that position.
^118	  B v El-B (abduction: sharia law: welfare of child) [2003] 1 FLR 811, [2003] Fam Law 299.
^119	  [1998] 1 FLR 231.
^120	  Ibid., p. 235.
^121	  EM Lebanon [2008] UKHL 64.
^122	  Ibid., para. [5].
^123	  Para. [5]. 
^124	  Para. [14].
^125	  Para. [52].
^126	  J. Walsh, “Commentary on EM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department”, in R. Hunter, C. McGlynn, and E. Rackley (eds.), Feminist Judgments From Theory to Practice (2010), pp. 443-448.
^127	  Ibid., 446.
^128	  K. Monaghan, “The Feminist Judgment Baroness Monaghan”, in ibid., pp. 449-458.
^129	  Ibid., p. 454. 
^130	  K. Mahoney, “Canadian Approaches to Equality Rights and Gender Equity in the Courts”, reprinted in R. Cook (ed.), Human Rights of Women (1994).
^131	  A. Pickup and A. Gask, “Case Comment:EM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department” (2009) 1 EHRR 84, 90.
^132	  J. E. Gribich, “The Body in Legal Theory”, in M. Fineman and N. S. Thomadsen (eds.), At the Boundaries of Law (1991), p. 69.
^133	   Re G [2012] EWCA Civ 1233 -chareidic community case, Re N (A Child – Religion - Jehovah's Witness) [2011] EWHC B26.
^134	  Re J (Specific Issue Orders: Muslim Upbringing & Circumcision) [2000] 1 FLR 571, Re S (Specific Issue Order: Religion: Circumcision) [2005] 1 FLR 236.
^135	  Re W (Minors) (1992),    Re P (A Child) (Residence Order: Child’s Welfare) (1999), Re N (A Child) (Religion: Jehovah's Witness) [2011] EWHC B26.
^136	  Agar Ellis, ibid., note 14 above.
^137	  Note 128 above.
^138	  W. J. Mommsen, The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber: Collected Essays (1992): see status and access to “life chances”.
^139	  E.W. Said, "The Clash of Ignorance", The Nation, 22 October 2001, pp. 1–5; Karim Karim and Mahmoud Eid, "Clash of Ignorance", Global Media Journal, no. 5(1) (2012), pp. 7–27.
^140	  See De Sousa Santos, note 23 above, summary of the dichotomy at p. 344 which he frames as a “diatopical hermeneutics”. 
^141	  R. George, “The Relocation Research Project 2012”, Family Law Week, 13 April 2012; R. George, F. Judd QC, D. Garrido, and A. Worwood, Relocation: A Practical Guide (2013).
